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NOTE 
Completing the Gbdel-Zermelo Correspondence 
JOHN W. DAWSON.JR. 
School of Mathematics. Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey 08540. and The 
Pennsylvania State University, I031 Edgecomb Avenue, York, Pennsylvania 17403 
Very little of Kurt Godel’s scientific correspondence has hitherto been pub- 
lished. An outstanding exception is the exchange of letters that took place during 
193 1 between Godel and Ernst Zermelo, an exchange that began on September 21 
with a letter from Zermelo to Godel criticizing the incompleteness theorem. Godel 
replied on October 12, patiently explaining and defending his results, but Zermelo 
remained unconvinced; his response of October 29 terminated the correspon- 
dence. 
Texts of the last two of these three letters, transcribed from copies in Zermelo’s 
Nuchlass in Freiburg im Breisgau, were published earlier in this Journal [Grattan- 
Guinness 19791, along with Grattan-Guinness’ commentary on the background, 
content, and significance of the correspondence; further commentary appeared 
shortly thereafter in [Moore 1980, 127-1281. Zermelo’s letter of September 21, 
however, was not found among Zermelo’s papers, though its content (but not its 
deprecatory tone) could be surmized on the basis of Godel’s reply. A copy of the 
letter might logically have been sought among Godel’s papers, but unfortunately, 
both Grattan-Guinness and Moore undertook their studies during the interim 
between Godel’s death and the organization of his Nachlass. Throughout that 
period, access to Godel’s papers was severely restricted, and Grattan-Guinness, 
in particular, was denied the opportunity to search there. Subsequently, on the 
basis of reports that Godel had lost many of his papers during the war, Grattan- 
Guinness presumed that Zermelo’s first letter “must be lost,” while Moore in turn 
referred to it as having “apparently not survived.” 
Happily, however, in the course of my recent cataloguing of the Godel Nach- 
lass the missing letter came to light. I believe that its exact wording, as well as the 
attitude it conveys, makes it worth publishing here as a sequel to and completion 
of Grattan-Guinness’ article. Accordingly, a photographic copy of the original 
four-page letter is reproduced here, together with my own English translation of 
the text. 
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TRANSLATION 
Freiburg im Breisgau, 21 September 1931 
Karlstrasse 60. 
Dear Mr. Godel, 
I am sending you, enclosed, a proof-sheet of my Fundumenta paper, and I would 
bl: pleased if I might count you among the few who have at least tried to take up 
tie ideas and methods developed there and make them fruitful for their own 
research. While I was engaged in preparing a short abstract of my Elster lecture, 
ia the course of which I had also to refer to yours,’ I came subsequently to the 
clear realization that your proof of the existence of undecidable propositions 
eichibits an essential gap. In order to produce an “undecidable” proposition, you 
di:fine on page 1782 a “class sign” (a propositional function of one free variable) 
S = R(q), and then you show that neither [R(q);q] = A nor its negation x would be 
“provable.” But does 
S = Bew[R(n);n] 
raally belong to your “system,” and are you justified in identifying this function 
with R(q), just because it is a “class sign “? I know that later on there follows a 
di:tailed theory of “class signs,” but for a critique the following consideration 
suffices here: in your formula (l), let the sign combination “Bew” be omitted and 
write instead 
n E K* * = [R(n);n] = S*. 
11 you then once more set S * = R(q*), it follows that the proposition 
A* = R(q*;q*) 
(I)* 
cm be neither “true” nor “false”; that is, your assumption leads to a contradic- 
tion analogous to Russel[l]‘s antinomy. Just as in the Richard and Skolem para- 
doxes, the mistake rests on the (erroneous) assumption that every mathematically 
definable notion is expressible by a “finite combination of signs” (according to a 
jired system!)-what I call the “finitistic prejudice.” In reality, the situation is 
quite different, and only after this prejudice has been overcome (a task I have 
made my particular duty) will a reasonable “metamathematics” be possible. Cor- 
rectly interpreted, precisely your line of proof would contribute a great deal to this 
and could thereby render a substantial service to the cause of truth. But as your 
“proof” now stands, I cannot acknowledge it as binding. I wanted to impart this 
to you early on, to give you time to check it over. 
With best regards, 
E. Zermelo 
’ [Translator’s note:] In fact, Zermelo’s reference (in Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker- 
Vtvreinigung 41, Pt. 2 (1932). 85-88) is a scathing dismissal of Giidel’s work. 
z [Translator’s note:] Actually, on page 175. 
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